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DEVELOPMENT OF ECTOGENESIS: HOW WILL ARTIFICIAL
WOMBS AFFECT THE LEGAL STATUS OF A FETUS OR EMBRYO?
JESSICA H. SCHULTZ*
INTRODUCTION
Artificial womb1 technology would allow conception and fetal devel-
opment to occur completely independent of a woman's womb or allow a
fetus to be transferred from a woman's womb to an artificial womb for the
remainder of its gestation. 2 Both of these possibilities raise a variety of
legal and ethical questions. Some commentators see ectogenesis, which is
the process of the embryo or fetus developing in a device outside of the
body, as a valuable medical development.3 For example, ectogenesis could
help those who cannot carry a pregnancy have genetic children without a
surrogate and could also save the lives of premature babies. 4 Others assert
that the development of artificial wombs will cause babies to be treated as
commodities and will debase women by replacing one of a woman's most
unique natural abilities with man-made technology. 5 The potential of this
technology is fraught with legal questions, including how artificial wombs
will affect the potential father's and the state's interest in the fetus; whether
contracts regarding artificial wombs might be enforceable; and who would
bear liability for mishaps that might occur due to artificial womb use.
6
* J.D., Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of Technology, 2009; B.A. Northwestern
University, English Literature, 2006. I would like to thank Professor Lori Andrews and Michael Loters-
tein for their insightful comments during the drafting process. I would also like to thank my husband
Steven and son Aidan for their love and support.
1. Artificial womb describes the actual device that holds the embryo or fetus, while ectogenesis
is the process of the embryo or fetus developing in the device outside the body. Frida Simonstein,
Artificial Reproduction Technologies (RTs)-All the Way to the Artificial Womb?, 9 MED. HEALTH
CARE & PHIL. 359, 359 (2006).
2. STEPHEN COLEMAN, THE ETHICS OF ARTIFICIAL UTERUSES: IMPLICATIONS FOR
REPRODUCTION AND ABORTION 81 (2004).
3. See PETER SINGER & DEANE WELLS, MAKING BABIES: THE NEW SCIENCE AND ETHICS OF
CONCEPTION, 118-19 (1985); Amel Alghrani, The Legal and Ethical Ramifications of Ectogenesis, 2
ASIAN J. WTO & INT'L HEALTH L. & POL'Y 189,190-91 (2007).
4. SINGER & WELLS, supra note 3, at 118-19; Alghrani, supra note 3, at 191.
5. See e.g., Irina Aristarkhova, Ectogenesis and Mother as Machine, 3 BODY & SOC'Y 43 (2005);
Stephen M. Armstrong, Womb and Board: Medical Advances in Reproduction-At What Costs?, 4
MED. TRIAL TECH. Q. (ANNUAL) 465 (1987); Julien S. Murphy, Is Pregnancy Necessary? Feminist
Concerns about Ectogenesis, 4 HYPATiA 66 (1989).
6. There are various other legal issues with respect to access to this technology and how experi-
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Part I of this note will provide an overview of the steps scientists have
made towards creating an artificial womb and the obstacles that remain.
Part II will discuss the balance of maternal, paternal, and state interests in
an embryo or fetus grown in an artificial womb. Part III will examine the
enforceability of contracts concerning embryos or fetuses in artificial
wombs. Part IV will discuss potential liability issues that could arise if
artificial wombs are created. Finally, Part V will propose solutions for
some of the most controversial issues that would arise should an artificial
womb be developed.
Exploring these questions makes it clear that the development of ecto-
genesis will increase, rather than resolve, the complexity of issues regard-
ing reproductive rights and the legal status of an embryo or fetus.
I. SCIENTIFIC DEVELOPMENTS IN CREATING AN ARTIFICIAL WOMB
Scientists have taken significant steps towards the development of an
artificial womb, but have yet to overcome the obstacles necessary to pro-
duce a surviving animal or human from an artificial womb. 7 An artificial
womb requires various components in order to successfully mimic a natural
human or animal womb. There needs to be a shell to house the embryo or
fetus, amniotic fluid to surround it, and a regulatory system through which
the embryo or fetus can receive the proper amount of oxygen, nutrients and
hormones. While some scientists have been working directly in pursuit of
developing an artificial womb, scientists with other research goals have
also provided significant research. 8 For example, research aimed at saving
premature babies and research attempting to lengthen the time that embryos
can survive outside of the womb 9 could contribute to future artificial womb
experiments.
The first component that a working artificial womb requires is an ac-
ments would be conducted. However, those are beyond the scope of this note.
7. See Simonstein, supra note 1, at 359 (commenting that scientists have yet to close the gap
between the second and twenty-second week of gestation); Yoshinori Kuwabara et al., Artificial Pla-
centa: Long-Term Extrauterine Incubation of Isolated Goat Fetuses, 13 ARTIFICIAL ORGANS 527, 530
(1989) (discussing the death of all goat fetuses involved in the artificial womb experiment).
8. The distinction between "direct" and "indirect" research towards ectogenesis comes from
COLEMAN, supra note 2, at 13.
9. One type of indirect research is illustrated by Dr. Teruo Fujii's "womb-on-a-chip" experi-
ments. In July 2007, Dr. Fujii and other researchers at the University of Tokyo reported that they have
designed a "womb-on-a-chip," lined by endometrial cells, which can hold fertilized eggs until they are
ready for implantation. Studies with mice suggest that, compared to the current system where embryos
are held in microdroplets, the womb chip could increase IVF success rates. Dr. Fujii next plans to test
the device with human embryos. See, e.g., Scientists Develop 'Womb-on-a-Chip', TELEGRAPH.CO.UK,




tual shell to hold the developing embryo or fetus. Thus far, shells have been
constructed both out of man-made materials and out of human cells. 10
Scientists have created artificial wombs for goat," mouse, 12 and human
embryos. 13 While the animal artificial wombs were constructed entirely out
of man-made materials, the experimental human artificial womb was com-
posed of actual human endometrial cells which were grown on a piece of
biodegradable scaffolding shaped like a human uterus. 14 Scientists have
successfully been able to construct artificial womb shells for both animal
and human embryos, and this obstacle has already been overcome.
In addition to the shell, there must be artificial amniotic fluid to sur-
round the developing embryo or fetus as there is in a natural pregnancy. 15
The amniotic fluid serves to protect the fetus from outside injury, allow for
fetal movement, promote lung and musculoskeletal development, and
maintain a constant temperature in the womb. 16 Artificial amniotic fluids
have been used in both artificial womb experiments with goats' 7 and hu-
man experiments with premature babies. 18 Thus, an artificial amniotic fluid
10. See Gretchen Reynolds, Will We Grow Babies Outside Their Mothers' Bodies?, 3 POPULAR
Sci. 72, 74-76 (2005) (discussing the human cell artificial womb used in Dr. Hung Liu's experimenta-
tion as well as the acrylic artificial womb used in Dr. Yoshinori Kuwabara's experiments).
11. In 1997, Dr. Yoshinori Kuwabara of Juntendo University in Tokyo used a goat artificial womb
to hold two seventeen-week-old goat fetuses; while the scientists were successfully able to incubate the
goat fetuses for approximately three weeks, both goats died after being removed from incubation. See
COLEMAN, supra note 2, at 11-12; see also F. Dolendo, Baby Machines: The Birth of the Artificial
Womb, 2 TRIPLE HELIX 4 (2006), available at http://www.thetriplehelix.org/documents/issues/ Berke-
leySpring_06.pdf.
12. Dr. Hung-Ching Liu developed a mouse artificial womb in 2003, growing mouse embryos to
seventeen days old, only four days short of the twenty-one day full gestational term. Although the mice
appeared to be doing well through the early states of the development, they became deformed and died,
reportedly due to the inability of their blood vessels to properly form within the artificial womb. Rey-
nolds, supra note 10, at 74, 77.
13. Dolendo, supra note 11, at 4.
14. Embryos successfully implanted and started to grow as expected, but Dr. Liu ended the expe-
riment after six days, to comply with federal regulations that prohibit human fetal growth in a lab past
two weeks. Despite speculation that Dr. Liu could move her experiments to a country which does not
limit human embryo or fetal experimentation, she has turned her attention to animal ectogenesis. Do-
lendo, supra note 11, at 4; Reynolds, supra note 10, at 74.
15. MedlinePlus Medical Encyclopedia, Amniotic Fluid, http://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/
ency/article/ 002220.htm (last visited Oct. 27, 2009).
16. Id.
17. Dolendo, supra note I1, at 4; Kuwabara, supra note 7, at 527.
18. Neonatal research for the use of an artificial womb for premature babies is inseparably linked
to the same type of artificial womb that could be used to gestate a fetus from its conception In the 1996
experiment, Thomas Shaffer, a scientist at Temple University, used an oxygenated liquid in a clinical
trial with thirteen infants born at twenty-three to twenty-four weeks who were not expected to survive,
and seven babies were discharged healthy. Jonathan Knight, An Out of Body Experience, 419 NATURE
106, 106-07 (2002); see also Dolendo, supra note I1, at 4; Corrine Lowe Leach ct al., Partial Liquid
Ventilation with Perflubron in Premature Infants with Severe Respiratory Distress Syndrome, 335 N.
ENG. J. MED. 761, 761 (1996) (documenting scientific results from Shaffer's experiment); Simonstein,
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has already been developed and used in experiments and will not be an
obstacle to artificial womb use.
Along with a womb structure and an artificial amniotic fluid, there
needs to be some type of regulating device through which a fetus can re-
ceive the proper amount of oxygen, nutrients, and hormones. 19 One promi-
nent example of a regulating device is an extracorporeal membrane
oxygenator ("ECMO") which serves to deliver blood flow and oxygen to
the fetus.20 While providing nutrients to the fetus, the ECMO also functions
like a dialysis machine by purifying the fetuses' blood.21 In artificial womb
goat fetus experiments, the ECMO devices were connected through the
fetuses umbilical arteries and veins.22 While these types of regulating de-
vices have been created, they have not yet worked well enough to produce
a single live animal or human offspring from an artificial womb.
23
There are two distinct ways an artificial womb could be used. First, a
scientist could create an embryo using in vitro fertilization (IVF)24 and then
insert the embryo into an artificial womb for the entire gestational period.
Alternatively, a surgeon could extract a fetus from a woman's womb and
insert the partially-developed fetus into an artificial womb for the remaind-
er of its gestation. 25
In addition to the challenges of the artificial womb itself, other chal-
lenges exist in order to use an artificial womb not only for the implantation
and growth of an embryo, but also for a premature baby or fetus which has
been removed from its mother's womb. First, some type of fetal extraction
must be developed that would allow doctors to remove a fetus without
harming it.26 Advances in fetal surgery will likely make this type of fetal
extraction possible. Currently, there are three types of fetal surgery: open
supra note 1, at 360 (citing Jack Stills, a neo-natalogist who noted that this fluid would increase the
survival of premature babies because "[i]t would be ideal to continue the in utero environment, keeping
the premature infant in a warm water bath (free of infection) attached to its artificial placenta").
19. Kuwabara et al., supra note 7, at 531; Simonstein, supra note 1, at 360, 362.
20. This device was used in Dr. Yoshinori Kuwabara's experiments with goat fetuses. See Kuwa-
bara et al., supra note 7, at 527-28.
21. Id. at 527-28; Simonstein, supra note 1, at 360.
22. Kuwabara et al., supra note 7, at 527.
23. Id. at 530 (documenting the eventual death of all goat fetuses used in the experiment); Simons-
tein, supra note 1, at 361 (observing that currently "the gap between the second and 22nd gestational
week is insuperable").
24. In vitro fertilization or IVF is "the joining of a woman's egg and a man's sperm in a laboratory
dish." MedlinePlus Medical Encyclopedia, In Vitro Fertilization, http://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/
ency/article/007279.htm (last visited Oct. 27, 2009).
25. See COLEMAN, supra note 2, at 81; David N. James, Ectogenesis: A Reply to Singer and Wells,
1 BIOETHICS 80, 86-87 (1987) (discussing the possibility of fetal transplant technology and its implica-
tions).
26. This will likely require major surgery. COLEMAN, supra note 2, at 87.
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fetal surgery, fetendo fetal surgery, and fetal image-guided surgery. 27 Open
fetal surgery is the closest procedure to a fetal extraction; although surge-
ons do not completely remove the fetus, they open the woman's uterus,
repair the fetus, and then close the uterus. 28 The risks associated with this
procedure mirror the risks of a Ceasaran section, with the added complica-
tion that there is a significant risk of pre-term labor, requiring that doctors
closely monitor the remainder of the pregnancy.2 9 Fetal surgery, which
surgeons once resorted to only to treat conditions otherwise fatal to the
fetus, is now being used for disabling, but not usually fatal, diseases such
as spina bifida.30 It logically follows that as surgeons perform more fetal
surgeries, they will develop better and lower risk techniques, some of
which might be applicable to fetal extraction.
It is unclear whether a fetus that has been successfully extracted from
a woman's womb would have different challenges when placed in an artifi-
cial womb as compared to an embryo which has grown in an artificial
womb from implantation. However, Dr. Kuwabara was able to take goat
fetuses which had been extracted from their mother's womb and success-
fully connect them to his regulating device for twenty-two to twenty-four
days. Thus, while the need for a sufficiently safe fetal extraction method
will be an additional obstacle to artificial womb use after the termination of
a natural pregnancy, the two uses for artificial wombs will be born of the
same technology.
Scientists are working to close the gap of time between the beginning
of gestation using IVF and the twenty-second week, which is approximate-
ly the minimum number of weeks of gestation at which a child still has a
chance to survive.31 Scientists face several difficulties in doing so. Current-
ly, with very premature infants, "[their lungs] collapse; their blood vessels
hemorrhage easily causing damage, particularly in the brain, and infections
and death are common. '32 On the other side of the spectrum, there is a
great amount of research being done on embryo development, including
how "a cell in a preembryo is 'preprogrammed' to its eventual form, func-
tioning, and timing. '33 This type of research will likely play an important
27. University of California, San Fransisco Fetal Treatment Center, What is Fetal Intervention?,
http://fetus.ucsfmedicalcenter.org/ourteam/fetalintervention.asp (last visited Oct. 27, 2009).
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Jonathan Dyer Stanley, Fetal Surgery and Wrongful Death Actions on Behalf of the Unborn:
An Argumentfor a Special Standard, 56 VAN. L. REV. 1523, 1527 (2003).





part in making ectogenesis possible, while it may not be intentionally di-
rected towards this end.34 Along with embryo development research, the
application of computer science to molecular biology research is also im-
portant to the development of ectogenesis. 35 Such research would likely
assist in developing a regulation device which would deliver the proper
hormone levels to a fetus in an artificial womb.36
Even with this developing research, scientists face several difficulties
in creating a functioning artificial womb. Scientists must find a way to
replicate the blood flow that a mother provides for the fetus, replicating at
the same time the proper amount of oxygen, nutrients, and hormones that a
fetus needs, in differing amounts, throughout the gestation.37 Additionally,
Dr. Liu's experiments show that there are still problems with getting blood
vessels to form properly within an artificial womb. 38
Still, some scientists are optimistic about their plans to create func-
tioning artificial wombs. In 2001, during an interview at the American
Society for Reproductive Medicine Conference, Dr. Liu stated that her final
goal is an artificial uterus that could grow a baby to full term. 39 She spoke
of "an actual external device with this endometrium cell and then probably
with a computer system simulate the feed in medium feed out me-
dium ... and also have a chip controlling the hormone level. ' '40 As of
2005, Dr. Liu commented that she expects to have a functioning mouse
womb in five to ten years, and a human model soon after that.41
Although an artificial womb has never produced a single surviving
offspring, either animal or human, there are ample reasons to address the
ethical and legal ramifications before that time comes. 42 As legal commen-
tator Michelle Hilbert wrote, "it is irresponsible to wait until the first child
is born of ectogenesis before discussing how the law will, or should, treat
that new form of assisted, and collaborative, reproduction. ' 43 We should
34. Id.
35. Id. at 362.
36. Id.
37. COLEMAN, supra note 2, at 9-10 (stable blood oxygen levels are needed); Kuwabara et al,
supra note 7, at 531 (proper oxygenation and nutrition is needed); Simonstein, supra note 1, at 362
(hormone regulation is needed).
38. Reynolds, supra note 10, at 77.
39. Christine Rosen, Why Not Artificial Wombs?, NEW ATLANTIS, Fall 2003, at 67, 70.
40. Id.
41. Reynolds, supra note 10, at 78.
42. See e.g., Simonstein, supra note 1, at 359-63.
43. Michelle Hibbert, Artificial Womb Technology and the Constitutional Guarantees of Repro-
ductive Freedom, http://www.law.asu.edu/Programs/Sci-Tech/Commentaries/ArtificialWomb-
Hibbert.aspx (last visited Oct. 27, 2009).
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address these ethical and legal issues concerning artificial wombs before
they become available for use.
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF AN ARTIFICIAL WOMB MAY RAISE THE ISSUE
OF HOW MATERNAL, PATERNAL, AND STATE INTERESTS ARE BALANCED.
As described in Part I, there are two general categories of potential ar-
tificial womb use: one type where the embryo is directly implanted into the
artificial womb for the entire gestation, and a second type where an embryo
or fetus is transferred from a woman's uterus into an artificial womb. These
two types of artificial womb use could each have different effects on how
maternal, paternal, and state interests in a fetus or embryo are balanced. In
the first general category of artificial womb use, an embryo is never in
utero, but rather is implanted and grows inside of an artificial womb. In this
scenario, could either the potential mother or father "pull the plug?" The
second general category includes cases in which a woman is pregnant and
wishes to end the physical pregnancy either because she wishes to abort the
fetus or because she must do so for some medical reason. When she wants
to abort the fetus, could the state or the potential father prohibit her from
obtaining an abortion if fetal extraction and artificial womb use is availa-
ble? If the woman is choosing to have the fetus removed to an artificial
womb could she later have the artificial womb unplugged? This section
seeks to answer these questions.
A. Ex Vivo Pregnancies
One scenario arises when a fetus is completely conceived and nurtured
in an artificial womb and then at least one parent decides that he or she
wants to terminate the "pregnancy." In this scenario, neither the genetic
mother nor the genetic father has a greater legal right incidental to their
bodily integrity (as compared to a natural pregnancy where the woman's
right is recognized as outweighing the man's interest in the fetus because
she is carrying the pregnancy). Davis v. Davis recognized that women un-
dergo more pain and a greater bodily invasion in order to donate eggs;
44
however, the court held that "none of the concerns about a woman's bodily
integrity that have previously precluded men from controlling abortion
decisions is applicable here."
'45
A court might afford an embryo conceived ex vivo and put in an ar-




tificial womb a different status than an embryo in a woman's womb or a
frozen embryo. Courts have generally given greater weight in frozen emb-
ryo cases to the party who does not wish to procreate. However, it is uncer-
tain whether this would hold true for a case where the embryo is implanted
in an artificial womb. Once an embryo is implanted in an artificial womb,
would either a mother or a father, either unilaterally or with mutual con-
sent, be able to "pull the plug?" These are all issues that go to the core of
how parental rights to procreate and not to procreate might be weighed
should artificial wombs be used.
First, an analysis of the enforceability of frozen embryo contracts,
which will be discussed in greater length in Part III, suggests that if an
embryo is conceived ex vivo and implanted in a womb, neither party
should unilaterally have the right to unplug it. An embryo implanted is
different from a frozen embryo whose potential for life is static (unless it is
thawed). Moreover, the state might have a greater interest in a life that is
already forming in comparison to a frozen embryo. Thus, it is likely that
neither party will be able to terminate a pregnancy already in an artificial
womb.
B. In Utero Pregnancies
1. A Case Where a Woman Seeks to Abort an Embryo or Fetus
A different scenario arises when an embryo or fetus starts as an in ute-
ro pregnancy. There is currently no paternal right to make decisions con-
cerning an embryo post-conception unless it is outside of a woman's
womb.46 Potential fathers cannot get injunctions to stop potential mothers
from having an abortion, nor can they demand that the potential mother get
an abortion.47 The United States Supreme Court has held that a statue re-
quiring a husband's written consent before his wife could obtain an abor-
tion was unconstitutional, 48 and that it would be an undue burden to require
a married woman to notify her husband before obtaining an abortion.
49
These cases demonstrate that the potential mother controls the decision
about whether to terminate a pregnancy within her womb and the potential
father, even if he is the mother's husband, does not have a legal right to
46. Mary A. Totz, What's Good for the Goose is Good for the Gander: Toward Recognition of
Men's Reproductive Rights, 15 N. ILL. U. L. REv. 141, 148-49 (1994).
47. Doe v. Doe, 314 N.E. 2d 128, 130 (Mass. 1974) (denying an estranged husband an injunction
to prevent his pregnant wife from procuring an abortion).
48. Planned Parenthood of Central Missourri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 70 (1976).
49. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 898 (1992).
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take part in that decision. 50 Although some argue that the father's interests
in the potential life of the fetus could sometimes outweigh the potential
mother's interest in aborting their unborn children, courts have rejected
these arguments and repeatedly affirmed that only the potential mother can
make the decision to terminate a pregnancy. 51
Some have hailed the artificial womb as a solution for the debate on
abortion, thinking that the views of pro-choice and pro-life activists alike
could come into agreement if a woman could choose to end a pregnancy
without terminating the fetus.52 A corollary to this argument is that ectoge-
nesis could create reproductive equality between men and women.53 Fur-
thermore, some might claim that if a mother chooses not to carry the
pregnancy to term, the father could still choose to have the fetus removed
and grown to term in an artificial womb.54 Theoretically, these statements
sound promising to reaching a compromise on one of the most divisive
issues in modem politics.
Along with the possibility that a father could claim a fetus unwanted
by the potential mother, it is also possible that statues could mandate that
unwanted fetuses be put up for a third party or the state to "adopt." A cur-
rent Louisiana statue states that "a viable in vitro fertilized human ovum is
a juridical person which shall not be intentionally destroyed by any natural
or other juridical person or through the actions of any other such person. '55
Therefore, Louisiana has chosen to protect the potential lives of frozen
embryos by preventing parent-donors from destroying frozen embryos that
they no longer want. Similarly, an artificial womb could allow a woman to
end a pregnancy while allowing the father, a third party, or the state to pro-
tect the potential life of the fetus. In this scenario, artificial wombs could
theoretically promote a satisfying compromise to the debate over whether
abortion should be legal.
Current abortion jurisprudence, stated in Planned Parenthood of Sou-
theastern Pennsylvania v. Casey and affirmed in Gonzales v. Carhart, is
that the state cannot impose an undue burden on a woman's right to an
abortion before the fetus is viable and that, after viability, the state can
50. See e.g., id.
51. For an example of an argument for equal reproductive rights for men, see e.g., Totz, supra
note 46.
52. See e.g., SINGER & WELLS, supra note 3, at 119-20.
53. COLEMAN, supra note 2, at 50-52.
54. Id. at 81 (discussing whether foetal transplant and ectogenesis technology should lead to a ban
or more stringent limitations on a woman's ability to get an abortion).
55. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:129 (West 2001).
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restrict abortions.56 While Casey affirmed that the state cannot restrict
abortions after viability without a health exception, Carhart upheld a statue
which did not have a health exception. 57
Casey and Carhart illustrate the centrality of "viability" to abortion
jurisprudence. The term viability refers to a newborn's ability to live out-
side of its mother's womb.58 Viability, by its definition, is not set at a spe-
cific number of weeks but "may be interpreted according to the state of the
art of medicine." 59 It does not mean that the newborn is able to survive
without any technology, such as ventilator assistance. 60 Therefore, the cur-
rent approach of using viability to determine abortion rights would come
under challenge with a working artificial womb because a fetus would al-
ways be able to survive outside of its mother's womb, so long as it was
placed in an artificial one. 61
Thus, one argument is that once artificial wombs become a realistic
medical option, the state could always restrict a woman's right to an abor-
tion because the fetus would always be "viable" in the sense that, if re-
moved, it could fully gestate within an artificial womb. This reasoning
leads to the conclusion that the current meaning of viability and thus cur-
rently applied abortion standard could not survive once ectogenesis be-
comes available. 6
2
However, this does not mean that pro-choice and pro-life advocates
will immediately come together and agree that fetal extraction is a satisfac-
tory replacement to abortion. A portion of pro-choice advocates will likely
find fetal extraction unsatisfactory based on two reasons. First, fetal extrac-
tion would likely be a more intrusive surgery than an early abortion, with
fetal extraction most likely resembling a caesarean section in order to trans-
fer the fetus without injury.63 This type of intrusion is not present with
early abortions, which typically involve a dilation of the cervix and a suc-
tioning of the inner walls of the uterus. 64
56. 505 U.S. at 879; 550 U.S. 124 (2007).
57. 505 U.S. at 879-80; 550 U.S. 124.
58. The definition of viable is "having attained such form and development as to be normally
capable of living outside the uterus." Medline Plus Medical Dictionary, Viable, http://www2.merriam-
webster.com/cgi-bin/wwmednlm (last visited Oct. 27, 2009).
59. Id.
60. Norman Fost at al., The Limited Moral Significane of 'Fetal Viability', 10:6 HASTINGS
CENTER REP. 10, 10-11 (1980).
61. Hyun Jee Son, Student Scholarship, Artificial Wombs, Frozen Embryos, and Abortion: Recon-
ciling Viability's Doctrinal Ambiguity, 14 UCLA WOMEN'S L. J. 213, 215-16 (2005).
62. Id. at 218.
63. COLEMAN, supra note 2, at 81; James, supra note 25, at 86-87.
64. MedlinePlus Medical Encyclopedia, Abortion-Elective or Therapeutic, http://www.nlm.
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Secondly, many pro-choice advocates believe that abortion rights are
based on the right not to become a genetic mother, rather than the right to
end a physical pregnancy. 65 For example, a woman who seeks an abortion
instead of opting for adoption may seek not only to separate herself physi-
cally from the fetus, but also to rid herself of the burden of knowing that
she has a child out in the world somewhere being raised by people she does
not know or have reason to trust.66 As philosopher Christine Overall ar-
gued, the right to an abortion consists of two potentially separate aspects:
the termination of the pregnancy and the death of the embryo or fetus.
67
Supporting this argument, ethicist Leslie Cannold found that pro-choice
women posed with a scenario of an unplanned pregnancy found ectogene-
sis an unappealing option.68 Women who would choose an abortion over
adoption generally expressed the same concern with having their child
raised by strangers, and it made no difference to them that they could have
it extracted at an early gestational stage rather than having to give birth to a
child before giving it up. Similarly, women who would choose to keep the
baby rather than have an abortion did not find the idea of ectogenesis ap-
pealing either, feeling that it would be an abandonment of their responsibil-
ity to the child.69 Although Cannold's study was limited, it demonstrates
that it is extremely unlikely that the abortion debate could be resolved by
substituting it with fetal extraction procedures.
However, the observation that women might still prefer abortion to
fetal extraction does not make a potential restriction on abortion, and its
corresponding requirement of fetal extraction or full-term pregnancy, un-
constitutional. Once artificial womb technology is in existence, the concept
of"pre-viability" and its use in abortion jurisprudence will become unclear.
Since this change will not produce the harmony promised by some in the
abortion debate, this technology will either dramatically limit abortion in
states that wish to limit it or, could produce a change in abortion jurispru-
dence where balancing the state and mother's interests will not be based on
the concept of viability. Either way, the focus of abortion debates will nec-
essarily turn from the issue of whether a woman has a right to end a preg-
nancy to whether a woman has a right to terminate the life of an embryo or
nih.gov/medlineplus/ency/article/001 512.htm (last visited Oct. 27, 2009).
65. COLEMAN, supra note 2, at 72-73.
66. Id.
67. CHRISTINE OVERALL, ETHICS AND HUMAN REPRODUCTION: A FEMINIST ANALYSIS 68, 68-
69(1987).
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fetus.
2. A Case Where a Woman Does Not Want to Abort the Embryo or Fetus
but the Fetus is Removed to an Artificial Womb
Another scenario is that a woman wants to continue her pregnancy but
due to medical reasons it is in the best interest for her or the fetus' health to
extract the fetus and put it into an artificial womb for the remainder of its
gestation in order to better treat health problems of either the fetus or its
mother. Could the mother later decide that the artificial womb be discon-
nected? Could the father? Does it depend on whether the fetus is less than
twenty-four weeks old, the current standard of "viability?" If the artificial
womb was disconnected, could the mother or father prevent a ventilator or
other life preserving means from being administered? These questions all
go to the issue of whether a fetus in an artificial womb would have the
same status as a fetus in a woman's uterus.
Just as the mother's right to terminate a pregnancy would likely wea-
ken were an artificial womb created, it is even less likely that a potential
father would have the right to disconnect an artificial womb following a
fetal transplant. The mother has put herself at physical risk and taken on
various burdens in carrying the pregnancy as far as she has, even if she
makes the decision to have the fetus transplanted to an artificial uterus. To
decide otherwise would force a woman to risk her own or her fetus' safety
by refusing a fetal transplant out of concern that the potential father's inter-
est in not procreating could outweigh her interest in procreation. 70
In conclusion, the state of current abortion law is based on the notion
of viability and thus would allow a state to unduly burden a potential moth-
er's choice to get an abortion. Similarly, a state could unduly burden a po-
tential mother or father's choice to unplug an artificial womb because a
state can constitutionally pose an undue burden past the point of viability.
Additionally, if an embryo is never in utero but grows entirely inside of an
artificial womb the same restrictions on "aborting" the fetus would apply.
Thus, the status of a fetus in an artificial womb would have the same status
as a fetus in the mother's womb. 71
70. Unlike the previous section, there is no case law applicable to this hypothetical artificial womb
scenario.
71. This of course could be altered if artificial womb technology changes abortion standards.
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III. IT IS QUESTIONABLE WHETHER CONTRACTS CONCERNING EMBRYOS
IN ARTIFICIAL WOMBS WOULD BE ENFORCEABLE
One of the ways that a genetic mother and father's rights over a fetus
in an artificial womb could be defined is through contracts similar to those
used by IVF clinics. 72 A possible artificial womb contract could state that
either party has the ability to end the "pregnancy. '73 Depending on what
the laws are as to at what point the embryo or fetus can legally be aborted,
the contract might state that, for example, either party has the ability to end
the pregnancy before the fetus is a certain number of weeks old. Even if a
contract complies with this type of law, the question remains as to whether
courts would actually enforce these contracts or whether they would strike
them down as against public policy. An analysis of how courts treat con-
tracts concerning frozen embryos and how courts treat contracts regarding
minor children demonstrates that it is highly likely that these contracts will
not be enforceable.
74
One point of comparison is contracts concerning frozen pre-
embryos, 75 which typically state how the embryos should be disposed of in
case of divorce or one of the spouse's death. 76 In A.Z. v. B.Z7 7 and JB. v.
MB.,78 courts held that contracts concerning the ownership of frozen em-
bryos were unenforceable, citing public policy reasons. 79 In particular, the
court in A.Z. v. B.Z. stressed that "forced procreation is not an area
amenable to judicial enforcement."'80 Similarly, the court in In re Marriage
72. Judith F. Daar, Frozen Embryo Disputes Revisited: A Trilogy of Procreation-Avoidance
Approaches, 29 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 197, 197-202 (2001) (discussing cases involving contracts which
dictate how leftover frozen embryos should be disposed of in the case of divorce).
73. This could hypothetically be specified depending on particular circumstances or it could be a
broader sweeping contract.
74. Another interesting point of comparison is surrogacy contracts, which have been enforceable
and unenforceable in different cases. Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993) (holding that the
surrogacy contract was enforceable); In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J 1988) (holding that the surro-
gacy contract was not enforceable). However, I will not analyze those cases here because they differ
greatly in two respects. First, they involve a third party carrier, along with the intended parents. Second,
the cases concerning their enforceability are centered around the rights of the surrogate birth mother in
not being forced to sever her rights to the child.
75. An embryo is an egg cell fertilized with sperm which has been implanted into a woman's
uterus, while a pre-embryo is an egg cell that is fertilized with sperm but not yet implanted. However, it
is disputed whether this difference is meaningful other than that technicality. See Michael Mulkay, The
Triumph of the Pre-Embryo: Interpretations of the Human Embryo in Parliamentary Debate over
Embryo Research, 24 SOC. STUD. Sci. 611 (1994).
76. Erik W. Johnson, Frozen Embryos: Determining Disposition through Contract, 55 RUTGERS
L. REv. 793 (2003).
77. 725 N.E.2d 1051 (Mass. 2000).
78. 751 A.2d 613 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2000).
79. AZ., 725 N.E. 2d at 1057; J.B., 751 A.2d at 619-20.
80. 725 N.E. 2d at 1058.
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of Witten held that it would be against public policy to "enforce a prior
agreement between the parties in this highly personal area of reproductive
choice when one of the parties has changed his or her mind concerning the
disposition or use of the embryos."81 The court thus decided that rather
than balancing the interests of the divorcing parents, it would not let either
party release the embryos without the other's consent.82 The courts in
these cases were concerned about enforcing spousal agreements regarding
reproductive choices and held these contracts to be unenforceable for this
public policy reason. 83
In contrast, courts in Kass v. Kass,84 Litowitz v. Litowitz, 85 and, most
recently, Roman v. Roman,86 have held that contracts regarding frozen
embryos were enforceable. The couple in Kass had an agreement with an
IVF program designating unused embryos to be used for research. 87 The
court in Kass held that the contract was enforceable after finding that the
contract was clear and the couple consented to the IVF program knowing
that unused embryos would be donated to research.88 As part of its reason-
ing, the court held that the wife's bodily integrity was not implicated, al-
though she had undergone several operations for egg retrieval, since the
embryos were not yet implanted. 89 Additionally, the court noted that while
the agreements "may, of course, be unenforceable ... appellant does not
urge that the consents violate public policy." 90 This seems to imply that the
application of this case to future cases is limited, because the court might
have found that the contract actually violated public policy had this issue
been raised.
In Litowitz, a divorcing couple was arguing over the disposition of
embryos fertilized with the husband's sperm and a donor's eggs.91 The
court held that a divorcing couple's agreement with their IVF clinic was
enforceable because it was a clear manifestation of the couple's intent at
the time they signed it; the agreement stated that left over pre-embryos
after five years would be disposed of unless the husband and wife con-
81. 672 N.W.2d 768, 781 (Iowa 2003).
82. Id. at 783.
83. AZ., 726 N.E. 2d at 1055; J.B., 751 A.2d at 619-20; Witten, 672 N.W.2d at 781.
84. 696 N.E.2d 174 (N.Y.1998).
85. 48 P.3d 261 (Wash. 2002).
86. 193 S.W.3d 40 (Tex. App. 2006).
87. 696 N.E.2d at 177.
88. ld. at 181.
89. Id. at 179.
90. Id. at 179-80n. 4.
91. 48 P.3d at 262.
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tracted with the clinic to continue storing them.92 In Roman, another court
held that the agreement between former spouses which provided that frozen
embryos would be discarded in the event of a divorce was enforceable,
stating that voluntary contracts "subject to mutual change of mind" do not
violate state policy. ' 93 The common thread in these cases is that they reject
or do not address the contention that public policy is against upholding
contracts over frozen embryos. Thus, the agreements are seen as enforcea-
ble as long as they otherwise constitute valid contracts.
In sum, the courts have so far been divided on whether contracts de-
termining the disposition of unused frozen embryos should be enforceable.
The courts holdings do not seem to be based on any small factual differ-
ences, but instead seem to be based on what the parties have chosen to
claim and whether the court chose to focus on public policy concerns or
whether it chose to focus solely on the contract principles of unambiguous
language and mutual consent.
Some argue that contracts determining what should happen to frozen
embryos in cases of divorce or death of the genetic parents should always
be enforced because this would create a bright-line rule that might motivate
parties to seriously consider what they would want done with embryos. 94
Additionally, as shown by the above cases, some courts are already weary
of couples being able to contract that, for example, embryos will be de-
stroyed or donated in the case of divorce. 95 These courts are concerned not
only with the parties adequately considering their choices at the time they
sign the contract, but they also seem to think that even if that consideration
was adequate, parties simply should have the freedom to change their
minds when it comes to something as important as bringing a child into the
world.96
A further point of comparison is how courts view contracts parents
could try to make regarding their children. Divorcing parents cannot con-
tract away child support to which the child is entitled on the basis that en-
forcing these contracts would be contrary to public policy.9 7 Likewise,
92. Id. at 268-69.
93. 193 S.W.3d at 50.
94. Johnson, supra note 76; Laura S. Langley, Sperm, Egg, and a Petri Dish, 27 J. L. MED. 167
(2006).
95. A.Z. v, B.Z., 725 N.E.2d 1051, 1055 (Mass. 2000); J.B. v. M.B., 751 A.2d 613, 619-20 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 2000); In re Marriage of Witten, 672 N.W.2d 768, 782 (Iowa 2003).
96. Witten, 672 N.W.2d at 782-83.
97. Dep't of Revenue v. Green, 983 P.2d 1249, 1251-52 (Alaska 1999) (holding that a court can
only accept a custodial parent's waiver of child support if there is proof that the custodial parent can
support the child adequately); Thompson v. Thompson, 696 N.E. 2d 80, 83 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998); Tilley
v. Tilley, 947 S.W.2d 63, 65 (Ky. Ct. App. 1997) (holding that courts are not bound by the parties'
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parties in a divorce cannot contract to make child support provisions non-
modifiable. 98 Also, the parties in a dissolution proceeding cannot contract
regarding the disposition of minor children. 99 The reasoning behind these
restrictions on contracting is that the rights that are being bargained do not
solely belong to the parents, but also implicate minor children who, as
stated by the North Dakota Supreme Court in Toni v. Toni, "have the most
at stake as a result of such an agreement but who have the least ability to
protect their interests."100
A fetus in an artificial womb has been implanted and is in the process
of developing, and in this way is unlike a frozen embryo. At the same time,
a fetus does not have the same legal status as a minor child.101 Also, while
courts involved in frozen embryo cases are put in the position to either
decide that the embryos could be potentially used, courts involved in artifi-
cial womb -cases would be asked by the party wishing to end the "pregnan-
cy" to make a decision regarding a currently developing life.
There are two types of possible contracts that could be formed regard-
ing an artificial womb. One type of contract might say that the pregnancy
must be continued under any circumstances. Another type of contract might
say that termination should be allowed. This second type, a contract autho-
rizing termination, would present greater difficulties to the courts because it
requires the court to take action to terminate a developing life.
If some courts are uncomfortable enforcing a contract that affects a
potential life, it is likely that a much greater number of courts will be un-
comfortable enforcing a contract that affects an actual developing life ra-
ther than a potential developing life which is presently static. When a court
does not enforce a frozen embryo contract it allows for the potential that
the unborn life be born at some future point; when a court enforces a frozen
embryo contract it ends that possibility that that frozen embryo could at
some point be born. In contrast, a court's interference with potential human
life in the case of artificial wombs is more involved. If a court does not
marital dissolution agreements in the areas of child custody, support, and visitation); Geramifar v.
Geramifar, 688 A.2d 475, 478 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1997); Ruth F. v. Robert B., 690 A.2d 1171, 1172
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1997) (holding that the agreement that stated the husband would support the two elder
children of the marriage but not youngest child was invalid).
98. In re Marriage of Singleteary, 687 N.E.2d 1080, 1086 (I1. App. Ct. 1997).
99. Truman v. Truman, 591 N.W.2d 81, 84 (Neb. 1999); Mitchell v. Mitchell, 517 S.E.2d 300,
305-06 (W. Va. 1999) (holding a separation agreement about the custody of children cannot be binding
because the welfare of the child controls the determination).
100. 636 N.W.2d 396, 401-02 (N.D. 2001).
101. McVey v. Sargent, 855 N.E.2d 324, 328-29. (Ind. App. Ct. 2006) (holding that a statue which




enforce an artificial womb contract the court is choosing to let a potential
life continue to grow; however, if a court enforces an artificial womb con-
tract the court is actually preventing a developing life from continuing.
Additionally, the results of time delay and inaction have different ef-
fects on an artificial womb contract scenario. In the frozen embryo cases
that have arisen there is one party who wants the frozen embryos to be used
while the other party seeks to keep it from being used. When the court does
nothing, the frozen embryos remain unused. In contrast, in a potential ar-
tificial womb case where one party wants to continue the "pregnancy" and
the other wants to terminate it, the embryo or fetus is continuing to develop
toward full gestation as the parties bring their case to court. The effect of
the court not enforcing a contract that says, for example, that one of the
parties can choose to terminate the pregnancy, is that the status quo remains
and the fetus continues to grow. Thus, enforcing an artificial womb con-
tract presents an even more active role for a court to take than enforcing a
frozen embryo contract.
There is also the potential of a type of contract that stated that parties
could mutually consent to discontinue an artificial womb. In such a scena-
rio, as both contracting parties would have the same objective (disconti-
nuing the artificial womb), the contract likely would be analyzed only to
determine whether the action is legal. If the law states that a fetus in an
artificial womb cannot be terminated once it is implanted, then a contract
between the two parties stating that with their mutual consent they can
terminate the pregnancy would likely be illegal and unenforceable. 102
While artificial womb contracts concerning mutual consent would
likely be enforceable or unenforceable based on the legality of what is be-
ing consented to, artificial womb contracts allowing a unilateral termina-
tion of the embryo or fetus would likely not be enforceable as they
represent a more extreme version of contracts concerning frozen embryos,
which are still often declared unenforceable. 103 Furthermore, a bright-line
rule that either unilateral or mutual consent termination contracts are unen-
forceable is supported by both practical and public policy reasons, as will
be further discussed in Part V of this note.
102. Of course, this analysis will be altered if the statute is found unconstitutional.
103. A.Z. v, B.Z., 725 N.E.2d 1051, 1055 (Mass. 2000); J.B. v. M.B., 751 A.2d 613, 619-20 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 2000).
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IV. THE DEVELOPMENT OF AN ARTIFICIAL WOMB MAY RAISE VARIOUS
LIABILITY ISSUES.
If human fetuses are grown to full term in an artificial womb, certain
risks cannot be assessed merely by conducting animal experiments. The
psychological effect of ectogenesis on a fetus developing into a child, for
example, cannot be assessed in experiments on animals. 104 As ethicists
Peter Singer and Deane Wells noted:
If it is unethical to attempt ectogenesis in humans until we have a rea-
sonable assurance that it is safe, and we can have no reasonable assur-
ance that it is safe until it is carried out, we seem to be in a classic 'catch
22' situation. Work on ectogenesis will remain forever unjustifiable. 105
This comment raises the question of what exactly would qualify as
"reasonable assurance" that use of an artificial womb is safe. It seems,
however, that no matter how far the science is perfected on an animal spe-
cies, this standard of reasonable assurance will not be met. Thus, the use of
ectogenesis could likely be seen as incurring too many risks for too few
rewards.
One possible way to circumvent this "catch 22" is by first using artifi-
cial wombs as experimental methods for very premature babies with oth-
erwise doubtful chances for survival. As noted in one article, "research on
nearly fully gestated fetuses is supported generously because it may save
the lives of tiny humans," while research on embryos more than fourteen
days old is banned by most countries. 106 Still, while these experiments
would provide scientists with an idea of how, for example, an eighteen-
week-old fetus would function inside an artificial womb, it would not pro-
vide them with the information of how an eighteen-day-old embryo would
grow. Thus, even if this type of experimentation could be deemed permiss-
ible on very premature babies, it would likely be insufficient without expe-
rimentation at the beginning stages of an embryo or fetuses' development.
Another solution for the earlier experimental stages of artificial womb
technology is to use donated embryos left over from IVF treatments, as was
done by Dr. Liu in her 2002 experiments.1 07 However, the reason given for
Dr. Liu halting her experimentation soon after the embryos were implanted
was to comply with IVF regulations. 108 Still, privately funded experimenta-
tion may circumvent regulations such as those issued by the National Insti-
104. COLEMAN, supra note 2, at 43.
105. SINGER & WELLS, supra note 3, at 130.
106. Simonstein, supra note 1, at 360.




tute of Health because they only apply to federally funded research. 109
So if this technology becomes a reality, without the security of know-
ing the results, who should be liable for potential injuries? What if, for
example, there was a power outage or the wrong dose of hormones was
used in an artificial womb? What if a whole generation of children was
born using this technology, and it was only then discovered that such child-
ren eventually develop serious physical or psychological health problems
later on in life? How would the claim of wrongful death apply? Would the
clinics or the manufacturer of these artificial wombs be held liable in a
class action lawsuit? Can potential parents ever assume the risk and give
informed consent to using their genetic material to create a fetus which
could have unknown deformities? Could potential parents ever be able to
sign away the rights of their children?
The first part of this section will examine how the doctrine of negli-
gence would apply in an artificial womb scenario, followed by how a claim
for wrongful death could apply to a fetus in an artificial womb. This section
will particularly address the issue of how the concept of viability would be
applied to embryos or fetuses inside artificial wombs. Then, the next sec-
tion will analyze how a class-action circumstance might be applied to ar-
tificial wombs. Finally, the last section will discuss whether potential
parents would be able to give valid consent to whatever deformities could
be incurred by their child from being gestated in an artificial womb.
A. Applying Negligence Doctrine to Embryos or Fetuses Harmed Inside
ofArtificial Wombs
The current doctrine of negligence could be applied to an artificial
womb scenario where harm is caused to the embryo or fetus. In a negli-
gence action a plaintiff must show four elements: (1) the defendant owed a
duty of care to the plaintiff, (2) the defendant breached that duty by a neg-
ligent act or omission, (3) defendant's breach was the actual and proximate
cause of the plaintiffs injury, and (4) the plaintiff suffered injury or dam-
ages. "10
First, in a case where an artificial womb is being used, the clinic or
hospital, or one of their agents, would owe a duty of care to the embryo or
fetus as a patient, just as a physician has a duty of care to the fetus during a
109. Sheldon Krimsky & Ruth Hubbard, The Business of Research, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Jan.-
Feb., 1995, at 41, 41.
110. Jackson v. Swordfish Inv., 620 S.E.2d 54, 56 (S.C. 2005).
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pregnancy.I1  As seen by the recognition of preconception torts,1 12 an emb-
ryo does not even need to be conceived, much less viable, for negligence
claims to apply in some states. 113 However, in these preconception tort
cases, courts typically see these torts as a breach of the duty that the doctor
owes to the future mother, which is extended to cover the fetus, and see the
negligence as harming the fetus, and then later having the foreseeable con-
sequence of affecting the not yet conceived child. 1 4 For example, the Illi-
nois Supreme Court held that injury to a prematurely-born child resulting
from its mother's negligent blood transfusion occurring years before the
child's conception was actionable.115
In an artificial womb scenario, however, the embryo has been im-
planted in the lining of the artificial womb within hours or days of being
inserted into the womb, making presumably all artificial womb torts post-
conception torts)116 Thus, going back to the duty of care, in an artificial
womb scenario the physician or scientist would have to owe the embryo or
fetus itself a duty, and this concept would rely more on the embryo or fetus
being defined as potential human life than in preconception torts. If a doc-
tor or scientist was not seen as having a duty to the embryo or fetus as a
potential life, then the negligence tort would turn into a tort for conversion
of "property" of the parents' genetic material. 117 However, it seems more
likely that given the current duty to the embryo or fetus in addition to the
mother, that the embryo or fetus growing in an artificial womb would retain
that same legal right that could not be breached.
111. Being that an embryo or fetus in an artificial womb would be a separate entity from its mother
the physician's duty of care to the embryo or fetus would be equal to or arguably stronger than the
physician's duty of care to an embryo or fetus in a natural pregnancy where the physician has a some-
times competing duty of care to the mother. A similar analogy can be made to a physician's duty of care
to a fetus undergoing fetal surgery. See e.g., Cynthia Lauriston, Fetal Surgery and Wrongful Death: The
Physician's Duty of Care to the Unborn Fetus Regardless of Its Viability, 53 MED. TRIAL TECH. Q. 177,
190-93 (2006) (examining a physician's duty of care to a fetus undergoing fetal surgery).
112. Bergstresser v. Mitchell, 577 F.2d 22, 25 (8th Cir. 1978); Jorgensen v. Meade Johnson Labs,,
483 F.2d 237, 238 (10th Cir. 1973); Renslow v. Mennonite Hosp., 367 N.E.2d 1250, 1255 (I11. 1977);
Walker v. Rinck, 604 N.E.2d 591, 596 (Ind. 1992); Monusko v. Postle, 437 N.W.2d 367, 369 (Mich.
App. 1989); Lough v. Rolla Women's Clinic, 866 S.W.2d 851, 854 (Mo. 1993); Graham v. Keuchel,
847 P.2d 342, 364-65 (Okla. 1993). See also Joshua Kleinfeld, Tort Law and In Vitro Fertilization: The
Need for Legal Recognition of "Procreative Injury ", 115 YALE L.J. 237, 237-39 (2005).
113. Bergstresser, 577 F.2d at 25; Jorgensen, 483 F.2d at 238; Renslow, 367 N.E.2d at 1255;
Walker, 604 N.E.2d at 596; Monusko, 437 N.W.2d at 269; Lough, 866 S.W.2d at 854; Graham, 847
P.2d at 364-65. But see Enright v. Eli Lilly, 570 N.E.2d 198, 204 (N.Y. App. 1991) (holding that
preconception torts were not recognizable); Albala v. N.Y., 429 N.E.2d 786, 786 (N.Y. App. 1981).
114. Renslow, 367 N.E.2d at 1255; Walker, 604 N.E. at 595; Lough, 866 S.W.2d at 854.
115. Renslow,367N.E.2dat 1251.
116. Dolendo, supra note 11, at 4.
117. See generally, Jessica Berg, Owning Persons: The Application of Property Theory to Embryos
and Fetuses, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 159 (2005).
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The last three elements of negligence seem to apply less controversial-
ly to artificial wombs. The second element, a defendant breaching his or
her duty by a negligent act or omission, could occur in a variety of scena-
rios. For example, a clinic could fail to have a backup generator for a pow-
er outage or mistakenly use the wrong amount of hormones in an artificial
womb. The third element, that the defendant's breach was the actual and
proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury, could be proven much in the same
way as in any medical malpractice case. For instance, should the artificial
womb shut off for a minute, the fetus could sustain brain damage. The most
significant potential difficulty with this element might be that if only 20%
of fetuses come to term in an artificial womb, and the claim is brought
because of a fetus that did not come to term, it might be difficult to prove
that the breach of care was the reason for the fetus not surviving to term.
The final element of negligence, that the fetus was actually injured, would
also be provable. Thus, a negligence action could likely be brought in ar-
tificial womb scenarios where the defendant breached his or her duty and
this breach caused the fetus' injury.
One potential obstacle to recovery under a negligence action would be
if states considered fetuses in artificial wombs as "nonviable" up until a
certain point. There is, of course, a strong argument that at any stage in its
development an embryo or fetus is viable because it is outside of a wom-
an's womb, albeit in an artificial one. However, since this type of scenario
has not yet unfolded, there is nothing decisive that interprets viability this
way. States have different standards as to whether a child who sustained
prenatal injuries can recover when the child was nonviable at the time of
the injury. Currently, however, most states recognize that there is a negli-
gence claim, if the child is born alive, whether or not the prenatal injuries
occurred before viability. 118
Thus, changing the definition of viability from capable of life outside
of a mother's womb to capable of life outside of any womb would be prob-
lematic for negligence claims where the injury occurred early on in the
gestation. The issue of viability is also important in terms of whether a
claim of wrongful death could be brought for an embryo or fetus which was
"stillborn" as a result of negligence that occurred when it was inside an
artificial womb.
118. See e.g., Day v. Nationwide Mut. Ins., 328 So.2d 560, 562 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976); Horn-
buckle v. Plantation Pipe Line Co., 93 S.E.2d 727, 728 (Ga. 1956); Daley v. Meier, 178 N.E.2d 691,
694 (Il. Ct. App. 1961); Torigian v Watertown News Co., 225 N.E.2d 926, 927 (Mass. 1967); Bennett
v. Hymers, 147 A.2d 108, 110 (N.H. 1958); Smith v. Brennan, 157 A.2d 497, 504 (N.J. 1960); Sinkler
v. Kneale, 164 A.2d 93, 96 (Pa. 1960); Sylvia v. Gobeille, 220 A.2d 222 (R.I. 1966); Yandell v. Delga-
do, 471 S.W.2d 569, 570 (Tex. 1971).
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B. Appling Wrongful Death Claims to Embryos or Fetuses Harmed
Inside of Artificial Wombs
For a wrongful death claim to apply to a claim of negligence, the emb-
ryo or fetus must be qualified as a "human being" under a state's wrongful
death statue. 119 States differ on whether viability is required for a claim of
wrongful death. Some states, including Idaho, Massachusetts, Oklahoma,
Pennsylvania, and Washington, have held that a wrongful death action is
possible when the fetus was viable at the time of injury. 120 Other states,
including Mississippi, South Dakota, and West Virginia, have held that a
wrongful death action can be brought for the death of a fetus which was
nonviable at the time of injury. 12 1 For example, in Wiersma v. Maple Leaf
Farms,122 the South Dakota Supreme Court held that viability is not a suf-
ficient criteria for determining whether parents can recover under a wrong-
ful death claim for a fetus because viability is relative to many factors
besides the actual stage of development, such as the health of the mother
and child. Still other states, such as New Jersey, Iowa, Nebraska, New
York, Texas, and Virginia, have held that wrongful death statues do not
apply to stillborn fetuses, regardless of their viability at the time of the
injury which causes their death.' 23 When a child is a live birth, 124 but then
because of prenatal injuries dies after birth, most courts allow for wrongful
death actions regardless of if the fetus was viable at the time of the in-
jury.
12 5
119. See generally, Lauriston, supra note I 11.
120. Santana v. Zilog, 95 F.3d 780, 782 (9th Cir. 1996) (applying Idaho law); Thibert v. Milka, 646
N.E.2d 1025, 1026 (Mass. 1995) (holding that there is a cause of action if the fetus is either viable at the
time of negligence or injury or born alive); Guyer v. Hugo Pub, 830 P.2d 1393, 1394 (Oki. Civ. App.
1991) (no cause of action for nonviable fetus); McCaskill v. Phila. Hous. Auth., 615 A.2d 382, 384 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1992); Baum v. Burrington, 79 P.3d 456, 459 (Wash. Ct. App. 2003).
121. Fed. Credit Union v. Tucker, 853 So. 2d 104, 114 (Miss. 2003); Wiersma v. Maple Leaf
Farms, 543 N.W.2d 787, 791 (S.D. 1996); Farley v. Sartin, 466 S.E.2d 522, 535 (W. Va. 1995).
122. Wiersma, 543 N.W. 2d at 792.
123. Marie v. McGreevey, 314 F.3d 136, 140-41 (3d Cir. 2002) (applying New Jersey law); Weitl
v. Moes, 311 N.W.2d 259, 272 (Iowa 1981); Smith v. Columbus Cmty. Hosp., 387 N.W.2d 490, 491-
92 (Neb. 1986); Raymond v. Bartsch, 447 N.Y.S.2d 32, 34 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981); Blackman v. Lang-
ford, 795 S.W.2d 743, 743 (Tex. 1990); Modaber v. Kelley, 348 S.E.2d 233, 236-37 (Va. 1986).
124. A live birth is defined as the child having a separate and independent existence from its moth-
er; the child must be completely removed from the mother's body, the cord must be cut, and the infant
must have an independent circulation of blood. Duncan v. Flyn, 342 So. 2d 123, 126 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1977).
125. See e.g., Pizza Hut of America v. Keefe, 900 P.2d 97, 101 (Colo. 1995); Group Health Ass'n
v. Blumenthal, 453 A.2d 1198, 1207 (Md. Ct. App. 1983); Sweeney v. Preston, 642 So. 2d 332, 334-35
(Miss. 1994) (a cause of action only arises once their has been a live birth); LaBello v. Albany Med.
Ctr. Hosp., 651 N.E.2d 908, 909 (N.Y. App. 1995) (a cause of action only arises once their has been a




These state-by-state differences in wrongful death statues prompt the
question of how embryos or fetuses growing in artificial wombs would be
defined under wrongful death statues. If a fetus' status as a "person" under
a wrongful death statue depends on its viability, additional definitional
problems arise with artificial wombs. Under a wrongful death statute, a
fetus in an artificial womb could either be: (a) a "person" from the time of
implantation into the artificial womb; (b) a "person" once it reached a cer-
tain number of weeks or stage in development; or (c) not a "person" until it
is outside the artificial womb. In Part V, the proposal section of this note, I
will suggest how a fetus in an artificial womb should be defined under
wrongful death statues.
C. Applying Class Action Doctrine to Artificial Wombs
Clinics would most likely be liable for negligence or wrongful death
claims, even on a class action basis, for problems that could occur in the
development and early usage of artificial wombs. Although there is not a
close equivalent to an artificial womb, a possible comparison is class action
pharmaceutical suits, such as the suits involving the drug Diethylsitbestrol
("DES"), which had effects on generations removed from those who con-
sumed the drug. 126 Some courts in the DES suits did not recognize strict
liability claims from plaintiffs who neither ingested the drug themselves
nor were exposed to it in utero. 127 Often these cases cited public policy
reasons for confining a drug manufacturer's liability within "reasonable
limits."128
However, there are various factors that could differentiate artificial
womb class action liability from DES liability. First, DES cases were prod-
uct liability cases, and it is unclear whether artificial womb cases would be
negligence cases or product liability cases. 129 Additionally, one of the im-
portant factors in refusing to recognize DES suits is that the third genera-
tion plaintiff was not conceived at the time of the ingestion. 130 As
discussed earlier, some courts do recognize preconception torts. 13 1 In artifi-
126. Center for Disease Control, What Are We Learning About DES?, http://www.cdc.gov/des/
consumers/download/leaing3_concerns.pdf (last visited Oct. 27, 2009) http://www.cdc.gov/
des/consumers/download/leaming3_eoncerns.pdf (last visited Oct. 27, 2009).
127. In re N.Y. County DES Litig., 589 N.Y.S. 2d 883, 883 (App. Div. 1992); Enright v. Eli Lilly
& Co., 570 N.E.2d 198, 202-03 (N.Y. App. 1991).
128. Enright, 570 N.E.2d 198 at 203.
129. Id. at 202-03.
130. Id. at 208.
131. See e.g., Jorgensen v. Meade Johnson Lab., 483 F.2d 237, 240 (10th Cir. 1973); Renslow v.
Mennonite Hosp., 367 N.E.2d 1250, 1255 (Il. 1977); Walker v. Rinck, 604 N.E.2d 591, 593-94 (Ind.
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cial womb class action cases, however, this would be irrelevant because the
children born from artificial wombs would almost certainly have a post-
conception claim rather than a pre-conception claim.132
Also, another substantial part of the reasoning for courts not finding
liability as to third generation DES plaintiffs was for the public policy rea-
son that a drug manufacturer's liability be confined within reasonable lim-
its so that they would keep creating and manufacturing new drugs. 133
Although there could plausibly be a claim that public policy should support
the use of artificial wombs, it is unlikely since artificial wombs would only
be used for premature babies or gestational purposes, unlike pharmaceuti-
cals which have a much wider impact. Additionally, while courts found
third generation DES claims outside of "reasonable limits," artificial womb
claims, especially from first generation artificial womb babies, would likely
not come to the same result. 13
4
Although the DES arguments could be applied to avoid liability if, for
example, part of a generation of children was born using artificial wombs,
artificial womb use may cease, and years later all of the grandchildren of
children born from artificial wombs might have some disability. However,
there seems to be no obstacle for those who suffered injuries from gestating
in an artificial womb to sue, even in a class action lawsuit.
D. Applying Waiver of Right to A Child Born from an Artificial Womb
There is an additional question of whether clinics or hospitals and
their agents could protect themselves from liability by requiring potential
parents sign a consent form. This consent form would likely describe the
potential risks of utilizing an artificial womb and waive the parents' and
potential child's right to sue if anything goes wrong with the gestation.
While in theory the potential risks might be explained to the potential
parents, it seems unlikely that scientists would even be able to accurately
anticipate and lay out the possible risks to an embryo formed from their
genetic material. In such uncertain circumstances, it seems unlikely that
clinics or doctors would be able to insulate themselves from liability mere-
ly by telling the participants of some of the various possible risks.
Additionally, parents should not be able to waive the rights of their
1992); Monusko v. Postle, 437 N.W.2d 367, 370 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989); Lough v. Rolla Women's
Clinic, 866 S.W.2d 851, 854 (Mo. 1993); Graham v. Keuchel, 847 P.2d 342, 364-65 (Okla. 1993).
132. This is demonstrated by how Dr. Liu has already successfully been able to implant human
embryos into an artificial womb. Dolendo, supra note 11, at 4-7.
133. Enright, 570 N.E.2d at 204.
134. Id. at 203.
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child to sue later for unknown damages that the child incurred during gesta-
tion in an artificial womb. As discussed before, parents cannot generally
waive a child's rights to, for example, child support. 135 Although parents
can certainly make decisions for a child, such as deciding on a type of med-
ical care or what type of school a child goes to, a right to sue for damages
during gestation differs. Similar to the case of a parent waiving a child's
right to child support where the parent is taking away the child's right to
monetary support, a parent's waiver of the rights of his or her child to sue
takes away the child's right to be compensated for a loss that he or she has
incurred.
As repeatedly affirmed by courts in negligence actions, a parent has
no right to waive a child's right to sue for the injuries that the child sus-
tained. 136 Additionally, although parents can settle their children's tort
suits, almost every state requires judicial approval in order bind the mi-
nor. 137 These cases are based both on the legal reasoning that a parent does
not have the right to waive a child's own future cause of action and on the
more general public policy that states should protect minors. 138
In sum, the greatest area of controversy is likely to be the issue of de-
fining embryos and fetuses in artificial wombs as viable from the time of
implantation. However, defining embryos in artificial wombs as viable
from the time of implantation, for both wrongful death and abortion statues,
is both a necessary and a workable definition. Additionally, class action
suits concerning artificial womb technology would be permissible and pa-
rental waivers of a child's future right to sue concerning injuries sustained
in an artificial womb would be impermissible.
135. Thompson v. Thompson, 696 N.E.2d 80, 83 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998); Germifar v. Germifar, 688
A.2d 475, 478 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1997); see Dep't of Revenue v. Green, 983 P.2d 1249, 1252-53
(Alaska 1999) (holding a court can only accept a custodial parent's waiver of child support if there is
proof that the custodial parent can support the child adequately); Tilley v. Tilley, 947 S.W.2d 63, 65
(Ky. Ct. App. 1997) (holding that courts are not bound by the parties' marital dissolution agreements in
the areas of child custody, support, and visitation); Ruth F. v. Robert B., 690 A.2d 1171, 1172 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1997) (finding agreement that stated the husband would support the two elder children of the
marriage but not youngest child was invalid).
136. Cooper v. Aspen Skiing, 48 P.3d 1229, 1233 (Colo. 2002); Apicella v. Valley Forge Military
Acad. and Junior Coll., 630 F.Supp.20, 24 (E.D. Pa. Dist. Ct. 1985); Hawkins v. Peart, 37 P.3d 1062,
1065-66 (Utah 2001) (state has public policy favoring the protection of minors); Scott v. Pacific West
Mountain Resort, 834 P.2d 6, 10 (Wash. 1992).
137. See Richard L Braun & Scott T. Seabolt, Don't Count Kids Out: Settlement By Parents on
Child's Behalf Needs Courts OK to Avert Later Suit, A.B.A.J., May 1997, at 84, 84.
138. Id.
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V. PROPOSALS FOR THE TREATMENT OF EMBRYOS AND FETUSES IN
ARTIFICIAL WOMBS
After providing an overview of the legal areas that would most be
affected by the development of artificial wombs, I will now propose solu-
tions for a few of the most controversial issues that would arise in these
areas. Each of these issues is centered in the main issue of at what point an
embryo or fetus becomes endowed with the legal rights of a person. This is
particularly important because of equal protection problems that would
arise if a fetus in an artificial womb is considered a person with legal rights
and a fetus in utero at the same point of development is not considered a
person with legal rights. Thus, in each of these areas of law a fetus in utero
should have the same legal rights as a fetus in an artificial womb at the
same point of development.
A. Artificial Womb Development and Abortion Jurisprudence Based on
Viability
I would propose that there is not a sufficient replacement for the
standard of viability, and that should artificial womb technology be devel-
oped, states would be able to constitutionally limit abortion under the
changed meaning of viability. The possible alternatives to the viability
standards are flawed and are not grounded in abortion jurisprudence. 
139
One alternative replacement to viability could be basing abortion
rights on a right not to procreate rather than on a potential mother's interest
in terminating the pregnancy, balanced with the state's interest in preserv-
ing the potential life of the fetus.140 In Davis v. Davis, the court used the
concept of a "right not to procreate" to allow an ex-husband to prevent his
ex-wife from using or donating embryos created during their marriage.
141
Adopting this standard, it is argued, would allow a woman to terminate a
pregnancy rather than be forced to undergo fetal extraction. 142 However, if
the viability standard was replaced with a right not to procreate, it would
presumably always be on the side of the mother since the fetus is still in her
body. Thus, the right to an abortion would no longer be a balance between
the woman's rights and the state's interest in the fetus, but instead a state
would not be able to impose restrictions on a woman's ability to get an
139. See Part 11 for a description of current abortion jurisprudence.
140. See e.g., Son, supra note 61, at 226.
141. 842 S.W. 2d 588, 603 (Tenn. 1992).
142. See e.g., SINGER & WELLS, supra note 3, at 120 (discussing how ectogenesis would change the
face of abortion debates).
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abortion. This would greatly change the nature of abortion jurisprudence.
Another possible replacement for the standard of viability is specify-
ing a set number of weeks of gestation during which a woman's right to an
abortion cannot be unduly burdened by the state. 143 However, this standard
would be contrary to the logic that the concept of "viability" is meant to
recognize a being capable of being independent of the mother's womb, not
a specific point at which it becomes recognizable as life. Therefore, this
option is also inconsistent with abortion jurisprudence.
A third potential suggestion is that there should be one standard for in
utero fetuses and an entirely different standard for ex utero. This is trouble-
some because, as earlier observed, this would lead to equal protection con-
cerns because a fetus in an artificial womb would be considered a person
with legal rights and a fetus in utero at the same point of development
would not be considered a person and not be given the same legal rights.
144
I would propose that the viability standard of abortion jurisprudence
should not simply be overturned for one of these alternative standards. In
my opinion, the underlying reason for the standard of viability is based on
the understanding that, once an embryo or fetus can survive separate from
the woman's womb, that states should be able to protect that life. Any other
standard seems inappropriate, especially considering that if an alternative
standard was adopted states could not impose restrictions on abortions that
would otherwise result in full-term babies, albeit with medical assistance. If
artificial wombs develop sufficiently and states continue to be unable to
restrict what are currently pre-viability abortions, then states will be unable
to protect a fetus' interest in obtaining the medical assistance that could
carry it to full term. Thus, I would suggest that states would constitutional-
ly be able to limit abortion if functioning artificial wombs were developed
because there is not a satisfactory replacement to the viability standard in
abortion jurisprudence.
B. Enforcement of Contracts Allowing Potential Parents to Terminate an
Embryo or Fetus in an Artificial Womb
I would propose that courts not enforce contracts between potential
parents that permit one or both parties to terminate an embryo or fetus in an
artificial womb. First, if the previous section's proposal is taken into ac-
count, then states could restrict the termination of an embryo or fetus, both
143. See e.g., Son, supra note 61, at 225.26.
144. Although this issue would need to be analyzed further, it is not within the scope of this paper
to describe these potential equal protection problems in-depth.
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in utero or ex vivo. However, even if the state did choose to restrict the
ability to terminate the "pregnancy," there are additional reasons that courts
should not enforce contracts allowing potential parents the right to termi-
nate.
As discussed previously, some courts have already shown a reluctance
to enforce contracts that couples have made governing the disposition of
frozen embryos. Similar to frozen embryo contract cases, courts might feel
that potential parents should not be bound by prior agreements when some-
thing as significant as a potential human life is at issue. 145 In contrast to
frozen embryo cases, courts would most likely be even more concerned
about their enforcement of a termination contract because they would have
to take an affirmative action to stop a developing life.
In addition to the probable reluctance of courts to enforce these con-
tracts, there are practical reasons why there should be a bright-line rule
opposing the enforcement of these contracts. Without a bright-line rule not
only would litigation increase, but there would clearly be various problems
with the timing of the lawsuits. For example, if a potential parent decided at
the sixteenth week of the "pregnancy" that he or she wanted to terminate
the pregnancy, assuming that it was legal under state law, by the time that
the court enforced the contract the fetus could have already been born or
enough time could have passed that the fetus became protected under state
law. Contracts allowing for termination would also be very difficult to en-
force without a bright-line rule because courts might need to examine the
contracts on a case-by-case basis, as demonstrated by how courts approach
frozen embryo cases. Thus, contracts authorizing termination could be very
difficult to enforce.
Furthermore, there are several good public policy reasons for this
bright line rule. First, a bright-line rule against the ability to terminate an
artificial womb pregnancy would make potential parents who have doubts
about having a child think carefully about their decision to commence an
artificial womb pregnancy. Likewise, if the risks of birth defects or other
problems are substantial, then a bright-line rule that termination contracts
will not be enforceable will deter potential parents from utilizing artificial
wombs until scientists can reduce the risks.
Thus, a bright-line rule against agreements authorizing the termination
of artificial womb pregnancies is consistent with both the increased legal
protections that I am proposing should be afforded these fetuses, and is
145. A.Z. v, B.Z., 725 N.E.2d 1051, 1058 (Mass. 2000); J.B. v. M.B., 751 A.2d 613, 620 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 2000); In re Marriage of Witten, 672 N.W.2d 768, 780-81 (Iowa 2003).
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consistent with various public policies that should be favored in light of the
potential use of artificial wombs.
C. Treatment of Fetuses in Artificial Wombs under Wrongful Death
Statues
I would propose that an embryo or fetus should be considered viable,
and thus for purposes of wrongful death actions, a "person," from the time
that it is implanted in an artificial womb. As discussed earlier, the term
viable is defined as capable of life outside of a woman's womb, not as ca-
pable of life without any technological assistance. 146 If the definition of
"viable" and of "human" meant capable of living without artificial assis-
tance, then people on life support would be technically "nonviable." Does
this mean that their beneficiaries could not bring a wrongful death suit? Of
course not.
One potential argument against this bright-line rule would be that
there should be some minimum stage of development that an embryo must
reach in order to be considered viable in an artificial womb. If artificial
wombs have a relatively small success rate, with, for example, one success-
ful birth out of every ten embryos, scientists and doctors would want to
protect themselves against a large number of potential wrongful death law-
suits. However, the suing parties would still need to show that some negli-
gence actually caused their harm, which would likely keep the number of
lawsuits low. Additionally, if technology is simply too risky, negligence
liability might be an effective deterrent to prevent wide use of artificial
wombs. The scientists or doctors could simply decide not to offer the tech-
nology without a waiver of the child's rights to sue. 1
47
Thus, embryos or fetuses within an artificial womb should be consi-
dered viable as soon as they are implanted. This bright-line rule will make
injuries to an embryo or fetus recoverable under negligence or wrongful
death statues and would promote responsible use of this new technology.
In sum, these three proposals would work consistently with each other
to increase the legal protection of embryos and fetuses as their opportuni-
ties to develop until full term increases with technology. The changed stan-
dard of viability would allow states to constitutionally limit abortion,
parents would not be able to contract to allow for termination, and embryos
and fetuses would be considered persons for the purposes of wrongful
death statues. In my opinion, these extended legal protections are reasona-
146. Fost et al., supra note 60, at 10-13.
147. Whether parents should be able to waive a child's right to sue is another issue in itself.
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ble should artificial womb technology make it possible for fetuses to devel-
op separately outside of a natural womb.
CONCLUSION
If ectogenesis becomes a reality, it is extremely unlikely that it would
put an end to the abortion debate. Instead, ectogenesis would contribute to
the complexity of debates over fetuses, such as the respective maternal and
paternal rights in a fetus outside of a woman's body. Additionally, the pos-
sibility of contracts about fetuses in artificial wombs and the potential lia-
bilities that ectogenesis might entail again raises questions about the
definition of viability and the point at which an embryo or fetus becomes
endowed with the legal rights of a person.
